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Many studies have documented empirical evidence about a negative relationship
between wages and unemployment that has been related to the behaviour of a non-
competitive labour market. Blanchflower & Oswald (1990; 1994) were the first
in pointing out the existence of a wage curve establishing a negative relation be-
tween wages and unemployment. These studies were followed by many others
referred to different countries and, in spite of the different point estimations, their
broad conclusion is that the elasticity between wages and unemployment is nega-
tive (for reviews see Blanchlower & Oswald, 1995; Nijkamp & Poot; 2005). The
estimations by Blanchflower & Oswald (1994) for the United States and United
Kingdom are around –0.10. Sanromá & Ramos (2003) estimate an elasticity of
-0.13 for Spain. In turn, Hoddinott (1996) find for Cote d’Ivoire an elasticity of
-0.12. In Eastern Europe, estimates are somewhat larger reaching in some cases
-0.3 (Blanchlower, 2001). In Latin America, the estimations of the wage elasticity
are -0.08 for Chile (Berg & Contreras, 2004), 0.07 for Colombia (Ramos et al.,
2010), and around -0.1 (in the long run) for Argentina (Galiani, 1999).
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However, criticisms to the estimation methods and issues of identification and
measures have led to some scepticism about the existence of an empirical law.
This debate motivated that Blanchflower & Oswald (2005) implemented different
empirical alternatives to estimate a wage curve for the US. Thus, attempting to cor-
rect for endogeneity and measurement error, they found evidence consistent with
the existence of a wage curve.
In Uruguay there are no empirical studies about the wage curve. However, many
facts of the period 1986-2005 make this country an interesting case of study. Be-
tween 1986 and 2005 the unemployment rate ranged from 8 % to 17 %; indeed,
the period comprises years of stable growth, a severe crisis, and a recovery. Addi-
tionally, during the growth period, the level at which wage bargaining took place
changed from industry to firm level. Thus, the data allow exploring the reaction of
the elasticity of wages to unemployment in different macroeconomic environments
and different wage setting processes.
Besides, a set of empirical studies concludes that there are large differences in
wage curve elasticities across groups: it is higher (in absolute terms) for young
and low-educated than old and high-educated workers, in non-union than union
sector, and in most of the cases, for women than for men (for a review, see Bart,
Bratsberg, Naylor & Raaum, 2002). The Uruguayan case may help to explore a
less studied dimension: formality and informality. We may expect that the elastic-
ity will be higher in a sector in which labour regulations are not enforced, as found
by Ramos et al. (2009) for Colombia. Surprisingly, Ramos et al. (2009) find a
null elasticity for the average formal worker and especially, for public workers.
We look for assessing the wage elasticity by formality in order to analyze if the
average wage curve is composed by labour categories that do not react to labour
market conditions.
The paper is structured as follows. In section two we briefly introduce the theoreti-
cal explanations for the wage curve focusing on the efficiency wage interpretation.
In section three we analyze the main features of the Uruguayan labour market in
the period 1986-2005. In section four we describe the data and present the empiri-
cal model. In section five we present the results and finally in section six, the main
conclusions are drawn.
THEORETICAL INTERPRETATIONS
The evidence of the existence of a wage curve shows that the estimated elasticity
of earnings with respect to unemployment is stable across countries. Specifically,
empirical studies have found a negative short-term relationship between earnings
and unemployment (for reviews see Blanchlower & Oswald, 1995; Blanchlower
& Oswald, 2005).
As pointed out by several authors, this stylised fact does not just reflect a labour
offer function (Card, 1995; Nijkamp & Poot, 2005). As unemployment decline
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means an employment increase, we may infer that a contemporaneous wage rise
and unemployment decrease could be just the reflection of a movement along an
upward-sloping labour supply curve. For this reason, the empirical strategies pro-
pose including the employment rate or the labour force participation rate of the
region as explanatory variables. The remaining negative relationship between un-
employment and earnings has led to a rejection of the labour supply function as an
interpretation of the wage curve.
And a wage curve is not a Phillips curve (Card, 1995). The wage curve has to
do with the relationship of unemployment with the level of real wages at a micro
level. The Phillips curve is an aggregate relation that can be derived from a model
of adjustment of nominal wages to unemployment. Indeed it has to do with the
relation between unemployment and the rate of change of nominal wages.
There is an agreement in the literature on the wage curve that the main explana-
tions for this relationship are based on: (i) a labour contract model, (ii) a bargaining
model, or (iii) an efficiency wage model. A summary assessment of these inter-
pretations is given in Blanchflower & Oswald (1994) and in Card (1995).
In the labour contract model, amenity values differ among regions but unemploy-
ment benefits and reservation wage do not. Thus, differences in amenities generate
differences in wages: regions with higher amenities will offer contracts with low-
er wages and lower employment (higher unemployment) probability. However,
based on an international review of empirical studies, Nijkamp & Poot (2005)
pointed out that the evidence does not support this kind of explanation. Indeed,
the labour contract model proposes a negative long term relationship but the wage
curve reflects a negative short term relationship. Moreover, there is some evidence
that unemployment and wages are positively related in the long term.
In the union bargaining model, the “alternative” wage available for union work-
ers in the event of dispute, declines with unemployment. Therefore, the unionised
negotiated wage depends negatively on unemployment as predicted by the wage
curve. Nevertheless, Nijkamp & Poot (2005) remarked once again that the evi-
dence is not consistent with this explanation because the slope of the wage curve
is usually less for union workers than for non-union workers.
The efficiency wage model seems to give the most attractive explanation. Card
(1995) argues that this model is more suitable than the labour contract and bar-
gaining models to explain the wage curve. Based on the Shapiro & Stiglitz (1984)
proposal, the model assumes that the wage premium to be paid to promote work-
er’s effort declines with unemployment. Indeed, the expected penalty of being
caught shirking increases when unemployment rises. Efficiency wages also rely
on turnover considerations. Recruiting and training are costly for the firms so they
attempt to minimise costs paying a premium to retain workers. Once again, the
premium will decrease when unemployment rises because it will be less likely
that the worker quit and find a new job.
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Barth et al. (2002) propose a model that combines an efficiency wage behaviour
and a wage bargaining behaviour. As pointed by the authors, it could be expected
that this model would generate a stronger wage curve than that expected by each
model on its own. However, they find that the combination of the two behaviours
generates a third effect (rent effect) that makes the wage curve less elastic in the
presence of unions. This prediction is more consistent with the evidence than the
predictions of the union bargaining model. The intuitive reasoning behind this
result is as follows. The increase in unemployment leads to a decline in turnover
costs per worker. The efficiency wage behaviour makes the premium wage to
decline and hence rents (net of turnover costs) increase. This has a positive effect
on the bargaining wage, because the generated rents are shared by the union in
the form of lower reductions in wages. Thus, Barth et al. (2002) expect a greater
negative correlation between unemployment and wages in non-union sectors than
in union sectors. In fact, they do not find a statistically significant wage curve
for union workers in their empirical work for Norway, the US, or Great Britain.
As they point out, ’these results suggest that efficiency wage mechanisms, rather
than collective bargaining, are driving the negative relationship between wages
and local labor market conditions’. On the basis of this model, they also expect
less elastic wage curves in countries with stronger unions and stronger union wage
bargaining.
THE URUGUAYAN LABOUR MARKET
Compared to other Latin American countries, Uruguay has usually had a high level
of unemployment, particularly among women and young people. Indeed, average
unemployment rates in the 1986-2005 period were 11 percent overall, 14.4 percent
for women and 8.7 percent for men. The rate was 25 percent for people aged 18-24
but only 7 percent for people in the 25-59 age range.
In Table 1 we show the evolution of unemployment, wages and GDP from 1986 to
2005. After the crisis that affected the Latin American countries at the beginning
of the 1980s, the Uruguayan economy went through a period of growth that lasted
until 1998, and there was only one year in which GDP decreased (1995). During
this period of growth, wages rose steadily and they only declined in 1990, a year
of high inflation, and in 1995.
Overall, economic activity increased in 1986-1998 but we can distinguish two pe-
riods in terms of labour market performance (Bucheli & Casacuberta, 2005). Until
1994, the unemployment rate was quite stable although the output/labour ratio
increased and employment composition changed, mainly due to a decline in man-
ufacturing jobs in the first half of the 1990s (De Brun & Labadie 1997). 1995
was a turning point in the level of unemployment. Indeed, the unemployment rate
grew from 8-9 percent in 1987-1994 to 10-12 percent in 1995-1998, and mainly
affected unskilled workers and men (see Table 1). This increase in unemployment
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was also related to a loss of jobs in manufacturing. But in those years, service and
commerce did not counterbalance this process and the output/labour ratio rose in
most industries (Bucheli, Diez de Medina & Mendive, 2001).
TABLE 1.
MACROECONOMIC DATA
Year Unemployment GDP variation ( %) Real wage Inflation ( %)
rate ( %) index (1986=100)
1986 10.1 8.9 100.0 70.7
1987 9.1 7.9 104.7 57.3
1988 8.6 0.0 106.2 69.0
1989 8.0 1.1 105.8 89.2
1990 8.5 0.3 98.1 129.0
1991 8.9 3.5 101.8 81.5
1992 9.0 7.9 104.1 58.9
1993 8.3 2.7 109.1 52.9
1994 9.2 7.3 110.0 44.1
1995 10.3 -1.4 106.9 35.4
1996 11.9 5.6 107.6 24.3
1997 11.4 5.0 107.8 15.2
1998 10.1 4.5 109.8 8.6
1999 11.3 -2.8 111.5 4.2
2000 13.6 -1.4 110.1 5.1
2001 15.3 -3.4 109.7 3.6
2002 17.0 -11.0 98.0 25.9
2003 16.9 2.2 85.8 10.2
2004 13.1 11.8 85,7 7.6
2005 12.2 6.6 89,6 4.9
Source: Banco Central del Uruguay; Instituto Nacional de Estadística.
In 1999 the labour market was affected by a downturn in economic activity, and
this worsened in subsequent years. In 1998-2002, GDP suffered an accumulated
fall of nearly 18 percent, the unemployment rate rose in 2002 to an unprecedented
17 percent and real wages decreased. Once again, it was mostly unskilled workers
who were negatively affected by unemployment (Bucheli & Casacuberta, 2005).
During the whole period under consideration, informality was quite high and tend-
ed not to increase very much (Bucheli, 2004). In recent years, around 35-40 per-
cent of the labour force has been informal (not covered by the social security sys-
tem). Informality is rather higher among unskilled workers than those who are
skilled: almost half of workers with primary school are in the informal economy
while more than of 90 percent of workers who finished college are in the formal
economy.
In addition, wages tended to become more concentrated, mainly due to the rise in
education rewards (Arim & Zoppolo, 2000). There have been many studies that
focus on wage concentration and the widening of the gap between the skilled and
the unskilled in the labour market. In any case, as is pointed by Amarante & Arim
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(2004) in a review of labour market performance, the analysis of the concentration
of earnings in Uruguay between 1986 and 2002 is still weak.
Indeed, beyond general macroeconomic performance, in all these years there were
changes in Uruguay’s economic policy that affected the labour market. Interna-
tional insertion changed due to tariff reduction: the maximum tax was lowered
from 150 percent in 1980 to 20 percent in January 1993. Besides this, in the 1990s
Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay set up an imperfect customs union (the
Mercosur) to establish free trade within the bloc and a common trade policy vis
à vis outsiders. Casacuberta & Vaillant (2004) adduce that the trade liberalization
process led to the adoption of new technologies that increased the relative demand
for skilled workers and thus increased the education premium.
Other explanations of the increase in earnings dispersion are based on changes in
wage policy (Arim & Zoppolo, 2000; Miles & Rossi, 2001). One factor was that
real minimum wages fell. Indeed, at the end of 1985 they were 94 percent of the
level in 1980; this figure shrank to 79 percent in 1989, 42 percent in 1994, and 32
percent in 2004. In addition, the mechanism of bargaining negotiations changed in
the 1990s. In the latter half of the 1980s, wages were set in collective bargaining
negotiations at industry level. The State ratified the agreements and made them
mandatory for all workers. In 1990, the government withdrew the wage setting
procedure and as agreements expired, collective bargaining was abandoned. Only
some firms with strong union workers continue to fix wages through collective
negotiations.
In 2003, a period of recovery began but the unemployment rate only started to
decrease in 2004, and it was in 2005 that real wages grew. It is worth noting
that important institutional changes took place in 2005: the minimum wage was
raised by 83 percent and collective bargaining was re-established. These very
recent years have not been analyzed as much as the 1986-2002 period, but the
most documented facts of the recovery have to do with the difficulties in trying to
bring unemployment down.
DATA AND MODEL
We use micro data provided by the Continuing Household Survey (Encuesta Con-
tinua de Hogares –ECH- for its initials in Spanish) collected by the National Insti-
tute of Statistics (Instituto Nacional de Estadística –INE– for its initials in Span-
ish) in 1986-2005. The ECH is a one-off urban monthly survey. Until 1997 it
collected information on the population in cities and towns with more than 900
inhabitants, but since 1998 the sample has been limited to towns with more than
5,000 inhabitants. In order to have a similar coverage for the whole period, we drop
the data on small towns for the years before 1998. As 12 percent of the popula-
tion lives in towns with less than 5,000 inhabitants, we can assume that the results
An estimation of the wage curve for Uruguay Marisa Bucheli y Cecilia González 267
obtained with this sample are representative of the whole country. However, the
survey under covers the labour force in agricultural activities.
We use the pool of the annual cross section information on workers between 18 and
59 years old. We drop people younger than 18 because the law establishes specific
regulations for them, and we drop people over 59 years old because retirement is
frequent in that age bracket. The two dropped groups amount to 10 percent of the
active population.
We estimate the following wage equation:
lnWirt = α+ βlnUrt + δXirt + ϵirt (1)
Where i represents an individual, r names the region where he lives, t represents
the year of the interview, W refers to the wage (in logs), Urt is the annual unem-
ployment rate of the worker’s region, and X is a vector of personal characteristics.
We use five regions following an usual geographical criterion proposed by INE.
We use two different proxies of the wage. The first includes regular labour income
in cash and in kind received in the preceding month divided by 4.2 (the number
of weeks in a month) multiplied by the hours worked the preceding week. This
amount is deflated using the consumer price index in order to avoid the effect
of price changes through time. We refer to this proxy as the “wage”.We use the
expression “adjusted wage” when we add three social benefits to the “wage”. We
calculate these benefits only for formal workers, that is, for the labour force that is
covered by formal arrangements. As the ECH does not allow us to detect formality
before 1991, we calculate the “adjusted wage” only for the 1991-2005 period. The
benefits are as follows.
First, we assign an estimation of health benefits. According to the law, private
workers have to contribute to the social security system and to a health fund,
specifically to the Board of the Social Security for the Sick (DISSE for its initials
in Spanish). DISSE supports membership of a private health system. Membership
requires the payment of a monthly fee that is financed by DISSE. In order to de-
tect the contributors, we use information about medical insurance collected in the
ECH. Specifically, the survey allows us to identify DISSE beneficiaries since 1991.
On the basis of this information, we assign to these workers a benefit equivalent to
the price of an ordinary fee.
Although public servants do not contribute to DISSE, some sections of the public
sector provide some kind of health benefit. However, the ECH does not identify the
recipients of these benefits so we do not assign health benefits to public workers.
The second benefit taken into account is the so-called thirteenth wage received by
public and private wage earners. The ECH has been inquiring this benefit since
2001. This recent information indicates that enforcement is weak among private
wage earners and that the presence of the benefit is highly correlated with contri-
bution to DISSE. Therefore, we add an amount equivalent to 1/12 of the monthly
wage to public workers and to DISSE beneficiaries.
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Thirdly, the law establishes a specific retribution (two-thirds of regular monthly
cash labour income) to be paid to private wage earners when they have their annual
vacation. The ECH does not collect information about this benefit. Therefore, we
estimate the benefit on the base of the reported labour income when the worker is
a DISSE recipient.
The vector of characteristics X includes years of schooling; potential experience
(calculated as age –years of schooling– 6) and the square of this figure; a female
dummy; dummies for the relationship with the head of the household (head, wife
of the head, or other); dummies for the marital status (single, in couple, or other);
dummies for occupation (private wage earner, public servant, self employed with
some capital, or self employed without capital); dummies for industry (manufac-
turing and energy, agriculture, construction, commerce, services, and transport);
and a part time dummy for those who work less than 30 hours per week.
Besides personal and labour characteristics, vector X includes dummies for the
year of the interview and for the region. It also includes the mean of the annual
regional labour participation rate.
As local unemployment is defined at a more aggregated level than wages, the es-
timated standard errors may be biased downwards (Moulton, 1986). Thus, in line
with previous studies we estimate an OLS regression and we always perform the
Moulton correction as specified by Angrist and Pisckhe (2009) and programmed
by Pischke in STATA:
lnWrt = α+ βlnUrt + δXrt + ϵrt (2)
Where Wrt is the average log wage for all individuals in region r in year t; Urt
is the annual unemployment rate of the worker’s region r in year t, and Xrt is a
vector of average values over characteristics included in the previous vector X in
region r at time t. We present these results in the next section and we analyze the
sensibility of these results to the treatment of some known problems mentioned in
the literature.
First, we study the effect of the regional partition. We work with 19 regions that
correspond to the political divisions of the country. Second, as the consumer price
index collects information about the prices in the capital city, the variable “wage”
does not capture eventual differentiated price changes among regions. Though it is
possible that a price of a specific good varies differently by region, there is recent
evidence that the price index of the capital city and the rest of the country have the
same evolution (INE, 2011). However, following Blanchard and Oswald (1994),
we also estimate a model for nominal earnings including a combination of regional
and time dummy variables.
Finally, we address the endogeneity of wages and unemployment problem. A com-
mon approach to take into account the simultaneity issue is to use an instrumen-
tal variable estimator. Thus, following the proposal of Blanchflower and Oswald
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(2005) we instrument the log of the unemployment rate with one and two lags of
itself. According to the C-test of exogeneity performed for an estimation in av-
erage aggregate levels, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity (both
for the total wage and the adjusted wage). Therefore, in the next section we also
present the results for the IV estimation with microdata and Moulton correction.
In addition to the estimation for the whole sample, we run the model for groups of
individuals disaggregated by level of education, gender, age, and occupation. In
all these estimations we use the overall regional unemployment rate.
RESULTS
Estimations for different periods
We estimate the wage curve considering alternatively the two measures of wages
and different periods. In Annex 1 we present the results for the period 1991-2005.3
As expected, the average return to education is around 10 % and the wage increases
with experience at a decreasing rate. Besides, wages are lower for women and self-
employed than for men and wage earners.
In Table 2 we present the unemployment coefficients for all the periods. In all
cases, we find a negative relationship between unemployment and wages. Anyway,
we observe some differences between the estimations.
TABLE 2.
UNEMPLOYMENT COEFFICIENTS FROM MICRO DATA REGRESSIONS (+)
1986-2005 1991-2005 1986-1998 1999-2005 1986-1990 1991-1998
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (E)
Log -0.087 -0.120 -0,086 -0.154 -0.006 -0.094
wage (3.63)** (5.59)** (0.030)** (3.29)** (0.19) (3.60)**
Log n/a -0.110 n/a -0.164 n/a -0.096
adjusted wage (4.67)** (3.37)** (3.30)**
Note 1. (+) Moulton correction for OLS standard errors.
Note 2. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
Note 3. * significant at 5 %; ** significant at 1 %.
Note 4. n/a The “adjusted wage” is not available for 1986-1990.
Source: based upon author main results.
As shown in column A, we find an elasticity of –0.087 for 1986-2005. Thus, an
increase of 10 percent in unemployment leads to a drop in pay of around 0.9 per-
cent. In column B we report the results obtained when working with data from
1991-2005. Remind that the advantage of this period is that it allows calculating
the “adjusted wage”, which is a better approach to labour earnings than “wage”.
3The results for other periods are available by request.
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We find an elasticity of -0.12 when the dependent variable is “wage” (in logs) and
-0.11 when we use “adjusted wage”. It can be seen that we do not find important
differences when using alternatively the “wage” or the “adjusted wage” as the de-
pendent variable. All these values are in accordance with the range of other coun-
tries´ estimated elasticities, which turn around -0.1 as reported by Blanchfower &
Oswald (2005) and Nijkamp & Poot (2005) in reviews of the evidence.
In column C and D we report the estimations for the growth period 1986-1998
and for the cycle 1999-2005. They are -0.086 and -0.154, respectively. This result
supports the idea that the wage curve changes under different macroeconomic en-
vironments: wage flexibility would increase in an unstable context. Additionally,
in 1999-2005 the negative relation is stronger when the dependent variable is “ad-
justed wage” than when it is “wage” suggesting that benefits, though mandatory,
are a channel of adjustment.
In columns E and F we report the wage-elasticity in 1986-1990 and 1991-1998.
Remind that the wage setting process was different among periods. In 1986-1990,
although the relationship between unemployment and wages is negative, the esti-
mated coefficient is not significant at the usual standard levels. In 1991-1998, the
wage-elasticity is -0.09. These results suggest that the wage bargaining at industry
level hindered the adjustments of wages to labour market conditions.
Other specifications
To estimate the wage curve, the geographical labour market has to be delimit-
ed. As was pointed out by Longhi, Nijkamp, & Poot (2004), the geographical
divisions are not “independent islands” but connected regions. Thus, local labour
markets are affected by the labour force movements between regions and the more
connected the regions are, the weaker the relation between wages and unemploy-
ment. Notice that the closeness between labour markets is related to geographical
proximity and communications development. In the estimations in the previous
section, we use a five-group division based on geographical criteria.
However, little is known about institutional or cultural barriers to internal migra-
tion and commuting. So, we perform an estimation based on the political divisions
of the country. Uruguay is small and is not a federated system of states, and it
is divided into nineteen political units that have some measure of autonomy. Ob-
viously, each one of these units is quite small. and we expect them to be closely
connected. In Table 3 we show the estimated unemployment coefficient under each
geographical classification.
We find that the estimated relationship between wages and unemployment is sen-
sitive to the geographical classification. As expected, the elasticity is lower (in ab-
solute terms) when considering nineteen than when considering five local labour
markets. As mentioned in section 5.1, when using the micro-data from 1986-2005
and five-region division, we obtain an elasticity of -0.087. This figure is more in
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line with the international estimations than that obtained with the nineteen-region
division (-0.029).
TABLE 3.
ESTIMATED UNEMPLOYMENT COEFFICIENTES IN OTHER SPECIFICATIONS (+)
1986-2005 (i) 1991-2005 (i) 1991-2005 (ii)
Five-regions division -0.087 -0.120 -0.110
(3.63)** (5.59)** (4.67)**
Nineteen-regions division -0.029 -0.071 -0.068
(3.43)** (8.59)** (7.85)**
Dependent variable: nominal wage -0,086 -0.119 -0.109
(-3.78)** (-5.97)** (-5.10)**
IV estimation -0,081 -0.124 -0.113
(-5.70)** (-7.70)** (-6.78)**
Note 1. (+)Moulton correction for standard errors.
Note 2. (i) Dependent variable: log wage; (ii) Dependent variable: log adjusted wage.
Note 3. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.
Note 4. * significant at 5 %; ** significant at 1 %.
Source: based upon author main results.
As mentioned in section 4 we also examine the effect of deflating the labour earn-
ings when we do not have regional consumer price data. In Table 3 we report the
wage elasticity obtained with a model in which the dependent variable is the nom-
inal wage, and a combination of regional and time dummy variables are included
as covariates. The estimated parameters are quite close to the ones obtained in the
previous section.
Finally, we also estimate an IV model using the lagged unemployment rates (one
and two lags) as instruments. Indeed, there is a potential simultaneously bias prob-
lem: the wage curve behaviour states that wages depend on unemployment but
unemployment may also depend on wages.4 We do not find important differences
between these estimations and the ones obtained as in studies for other countries
(see Blanchflower and Oswald, 1995).
Groups Elasticities
In this section we estimate the elasticity of wages to unemployment for disaggre-
gated groups of workers. This analysis allows us to know if unemployment affects
groups of workers differently. We always use the overall regional unemployment
rate, so this rate extends beyond the group local labour market. We work with
4Notice that as pointed by Njjkamp & Poot (2005), few studies control for endogeneity of unem-
ployment because of a theoretical argument when using micro-data set. The local unemployment
rate affects the wage of an individual worker, but we may not expect that the wage of an individual
affects a macro-variable (the unemployment rate).
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the data from 1991-2005 because we can use both “wage” and “adjusted wage” as
dependent variables. As the two estimations show a similar structure of elastici-
ties, we analyze the results focusing on the point estimations obtained when using
“wage”. The coefficients are reported in Table 4.
TABLE 4.
UNEMPLOYMENT COEFFICIENTS FOR GROUPS OF INDIVIDUALS (1991-2005)
(*)
Log wage Log adjusted wage
All workers -0.120 -0.110
(5.59)** (4.67)**
Age
18 - 24 -0.265 -0.242
(6.14)** (5.51)**
25 - 49 -0.090 -0.081
(4.15)** (3.39)**








0 - 8 -0.158 -0.145
(5.09)** (4.69)**
9 - 11 -0.144 -0.139
(4.15)** (4.09)**
12 or more -0.041 -0.034
(1.17) (0.98)
Occupation
Public wage earner -0.040 -0.040
(1.47) (1.47)









Note 1. (*) Moulton correction for OLS standard errors.
Note 2. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.
Note 3. * significant at 5 %; ** significant at 1 %.
Source: based upon author main results.
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Age
We distinguish three groups of ages: a youth group (18-24 years old), prime-age
workers (24-49 years old), and seniors (50-59 years old). We find that the wage
curve is deeper for the younger workers as is reported for other countries (Blanch-
flower & Oswald, 1994; Hoddinott, 1996). Specifically in the Uruguayan case,
we find an elasticity of -0.265 for the 18-24 youth and an elasticity of around -
0.09 for workers over 24 years old. Notice that the earnings of young people are
more sensitive but we do not find a big difference between prime-age workers and
seniors.
The differences in the wage curves for different ages could be explained by their
different behaviour as regards shirking and turnover. Hoddinott (1996) argues that
the higher the specific human capital of the worker, the more costly it is to dis-
miss him or her and to recruit and train a new worker. In the efficiency model
framework, the wage premium needed to promote non-shirking decreases with
unemployment. But, as prime age workers have a higher investment in specific
human capital, the premium will not decline as much as it will for younger work-
ers. This means that firms are more tolerant of shirking by highly specific human
capital workers. Hence, as unemployment exerts a greater effect on workers with
less specific human capital, young people’s wages are more influenced by unem-
ployment.
Gender
In the empirical literature, the analysis of the wage curve by gender does not lead
to similar conclusions. Our estimations indicate that in Uruguay the elasticity is
greater for women (-0.152) than for men (-0.103). This gender pattern is similar to
that obtained for East Germany (Baktagi, Blien, & Wolf, 2000), Turkey (Ilkkara-
can & Selim, 2003), and Chile (Berg & Contreras, 2004). However, the opposite
result is obtained for the USA and the UK (Blanchflower & Oswald, 1994). In the
case of Spain, Sanromá & Ramos (2003) find a strong wage curve for men but a
non-significant unemployment effect for women.
Groot et al. (1992) do not find a wage curve for women either. They suggest
that there is a wage curve for women but the negative relation is not captured by
the data because of a discouraged worker effect. This phenomenon means that
when unemployment rises, women react by leaving the labour market. Therefore,
although a rise in unemployment pushes down wages, this effect is outstripped by
an increase in wages caused by a decrease in the female labour supply caused by
the discouragement effect.
Using an analogous reasoning, we could argue that in Uruguayan female behaviour
an added worker effect would prevail. In fact, Bucheli (2002) finds some indication
of the presence of an added worker behaviour among Uruguayan married women.
Thus, when unemployment rises, women’s wages would decrease for two reasons.
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First, there is a wage curve effect. Second, the decline in household earnings leads
to an increase in female labour supply that pushes down female wages reinforc-
ing the first effect. Consequently, the estimated wage curve would be deeper for
women than for men.
Besides, as for age differences, the gap in elasticity could be the result of a gender
difference in specific human capital accumulation or in unionised behaviour.
Schooling
We classified workers on the basis of years of schooling, considering three levels.
The first one contains workers who did not finish the prevailing compulsory legal
minimum level of education, which means they have less than 9 years of school-
ing. The second group is made up of workers with 9 to 11 years of schooling.
This group corresponds to people who completed the minimum level of education
but have not finished high-school. Finally, the third category is for workers who
finished high-school and eventually attended college.
We do not find a significant effect of unemployment on wages for workers with
college studies. However, a wage curve relation exists for workers with less than
12 years of schooling. This relationship is stronger for the less educated (-0.158)
than for workers with between 9 and 11 years of schooling (-0.144). These results
are in harmony with estimations for other countries; said estimations also find
higher elasticities for the less educated such in the US and the UK (Blanchflower
& Oswald, 1994), Turkey (Ilkkaracan & Selim, 2003), Chile (Berg & Contreras,
2004). Once again, low specific capital endowment may explain this result. In-
deed, at least in the Uruguayan case, the less educated were specially affected by
the changes in the 1990’s. With the loss of jobs in manufacturing and the adop-
tion of new technologies, we may suppose that less-educated workers lost specific
capital (they had accumulated specific capital for tasks that disappeared).
Occupation
We also estimate different wage curves for private wage earners, public workers
and the self-employed. We find that the coefficient for public employees is negative
but it is not significant at the usual standard levels, as found by Ramos et al. (2010)
for Colombia. We may conclude that there is no wage curve for the public sector
and that the degree of wage flexibility is higher in the private sector. Indeed, private
wage earners and self-employed workers have a significant negative wage curve.
The relationship is stronger for the self-employed (-0.178) than for private wage
earners (-0.132). This result may be caused by movements between salaried mar-
ket and self-employment driven by unemployment. Indeed, it has been argued that
in Latin American countries, self-employment takes the role of “hidden-
unemployment” in the downturns. Thus, a rise in unemployment would lead to
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a shift from private salaried market to self-employment. The consequent increas-
ing competition among the self-employed would push down their earnings and
hence, the wage curve of this group would be deeper than the salaried group.
This conclusion is not shared by Berg & Contreras (2004), who do not confirm
this elasticity pattern with Chilean data. On the contrary, they find that unemploy-
ment elasticity is more negative for salaried workers and conclude that, possibly
because to enter self-employment is not easy, this strategy does not act as a buffer
in economic recessions.
Formality
Finally, we distinguish between formal and informal workers. As presented in
section 3, we define formal workers as those who contribute to the social security
system.
We find that both formal and informal workers have negative unemployment elas-
ticity. The relation is more negative for informal (-0.241) than for formal workers
(-0.058). Once again, we may infer that the contribution to the social security
system changes during the business cycle. First, in economic recessions when
unemployment rises, non-contributors would accept more severe pay cuts than
contributors, because they have less bargaining power. Second, the businesses that
are more affected would not only reduce earnings more sharply but also opt more
frequently for evasion. Third, it has been argued that in downturns large enter-
prises try to avoid labour regulation costs by subcontracting workers in little units
in which non-contribution is more likely. Finally, the above-mentioned shifts be-
tween private salaried labour market and self-employment during recessions are
also important. Indeed, when self-employment increases as a strategy reaction to
unemployment, these new jobs are usually informal.
CONCLUSIONS
We estimated a wage curve for the period 1986-2005 using two different proxies
of real wages, two proxies of nominal wage (controlling inflation with time and
regional dummies), and two different geographical divisions. We alternatively
run an OLS model and an IV estimation. In all cases we obtain a negative wage
elasticity that indicates the presence of a wage curve behaviour. Nevertheless, the
elasticity is sensitive to the period chosen and is different for different group of
workers.
The estimations suggest that the relationship depends on institutional arrange-
ments. Indeed, when we estimate the wage curve for 1986-1990 (when the rule
in wage determination was the collective bargaining at the industry level), the esti-
mation of the elasticity is non-different from zero. . . But in 1991-1998, when this
policy was abandoned, a wage curve behaviour emerges. We may conclude that the
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decentralization (that is, the wage bargaining at firm level) gave room to increase
the responsiveness of wages to market conditions.
The estimations also indicate that the wage curve is stronger under instability con-
ditions. Notice that we also find that it is stronger when including the mandatory
labour benefits in the wage and for informal workers. Thus, we may interpret that
non-compliance with (at least some) labour norms works as an adjustment mecha-
nism in downturns. Indeed, our results are consistent with the idea that informality
acts as a buffer under adverse macroeconomic shocks. Similar conclusion arises
from the results for Colombia (Ramos et al., 2010) but does not for the case of
Chile (Berg & Contreras, 2004) suggesting that the informality is a heterogeneous
phenomenon in the Latin-American region.
We also find that the elasticity is higher for the population groups with higher
unemployment rate: the young, women, and low-educated workers. Two other
explanations may be considered. First, these workers are more likely informal
than formal, and the wage elasticity is higher for informal workers. Second, we
may think that those groups have less specific capital. In the case of some low-
educated workers, the low specific capital would be a consequence of the structural
changes stemmed from trade-openness and technological change that character-
ized the 1990’s.
Finally, the elasticity varies among groups of workers and for some of them there
is not a significant effect of unemployment in wages. This is the case among
higher-educated workers and the public workers. At the other end of the scale,
wage curve behaviour is strong for the lower-educated, young, informal workers,
private salaried, and the self-employed. Also, the relation is stronger for women
than for men.
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ANNEX 1.
RESULTS OF OLS ESTIMATIONS WITH MOULTON CORRECTION (1991-2005)
Regressors Dependent variable
Wage Adjusted w
Log unemployment rate -0.120 -0.110
(5.59)** (4.67)**
Years of schooling 0.101 0.103
(247.85)** (249.42)**
Potential experience 0.029 0.029
(68.25)** (66.86)**




Head of the household 0.181 0.176
(45.65)** (44.05)**




Married or in couple or other 0.108 0.121
(23.24)** (25.83)**











Labour participation rate Yes Yes
Constant Yes Yes
Observations 278.730 278.730
Note 1. Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses.
Note 2. * significant at 5 %; ** significant at 1 %.
Source: based upon author main results.
